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In Why Our Next President May Keep His or Her Senate Seat: A
Conjecture on the Constitution's Incompatibility Clause, Seth Barrett
Tillman argues that a sitting President may serve simultaneously as a
member of Congress.1 The Incompatibility Clause speaks to this very
matter. It specifies that "no Person holding any Office under the
United States, shall be a Member of either House during his
Continuance in Office."2 Mr. Tillman asserts that the President is
neither an officer nor holds an office "under the United States."3
Though he cites many different law review articles and constitutional
4
provisions, Mr. Tillman has done little to dislodge conventional
wisdom. The President occupies an "Office under the United States."
Hence, no sitting member of Congress may concurrently serve as
President.
I.

DOES THE PRESIDENT OCCUPY AN "OFFICE"?

The Constitution leaves no room for cavil. Article II, Section 1
provides that the President "shall hold his Office during the Term of
four Years."5 It also limits who may hold that office:
No person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United
States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be

* Herzog Research Professor of Law, University of San Diego; James Madison Fellow,
James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions, Princeton University.
1. Seth Barrett Tillman, Why Our Next President May Keep His or Her Senate Seat: A
Conjecture on the Constitution’s Incompatibility Clause, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y
SIDEBAR 1, 2–3 (2008).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
3. Tillman, supra note 1, at 32.
4. See, e.g., id. at 1–2 n.3 (collecting the conventional wisdom); id. at 14 n.33 (noting
commentators equation of the President with other civil officers); id. at 14–23 (discussing
various constitutional clauses and their differing interpretations).
5. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
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eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be
eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of
thirty-five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the
6
United States.

The now-superseded provisions dealing with presidential
7
succession repeatedly refer to the President's office. Furthermore, the
Presidential Oath Clause dictates that before he enters on the
"Execution of his Office," the President must take an oath promising
to "faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States."8
Finally, the text of numerous amendments—the Twelfth, TwentySecond, and Twenty-Fifth—confirms that the President occupies an
office.9
Curiously, Mr. Tillman never discusses these provisions fatal to his
first claim. He argues instead that the President is not an officer, but
10
"a holder of an Article VI public trust—a public fiduciary." Hence,
Mr. Tillman apparently believes that the office of the President is not
filled by an officer but by a holder—a holder of a public trust. From
the corporate law field, Mr. Tillman tries to conjure up evidence of
such officer-less offices. He argues that corporate directors occupy
offices and yet are not regarded as corporate officers.11 Unfortunately,
none of his examples indicate that, though directors hold offices, they
are not officers. At most, Mr. Tillman demonstrates that in the
corporate context, "officers" typically refers to Treasurers, Chief
12
Executives, etc. This hardly establishes that directors are not officers,
but instead merely suggests that individuals often use "officers" in a
more limited sense to encompass only some corporate officers. If
directors occupy offices, as Mr. Tillman claims, they are also officers,
albeit not the ones who immediately come to mind.
Regardless, whether our world currently abounds with officer-less
offices, Mr. Tillman cites no founding-era usage suggesting that this

6. Id. at art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (emphasis added).
7. Id. at art. II, § 1, cl. 6, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XXV (referring to “the
Removal of the President from Office” and “the Powers and Duties of the said Office”)
(emphasis added).
8. U.S. CONST. art II, § 1, cl. 8.
9. See id. at amend. XII (discussing Constitutional ineligibility “to the office of
President”); id. at amend. XXII, § 1 (referring multiple times to the “office of the President”);
id. at amend. XXV (discussing “the removal of the President from office” and referring multiple
times to the “powers and duties of his [the President’s] office”).
10. Tillman, supra note 1, at 11 (citation omitted).
11. Id. at 10–11 & n.24.
12. Id.

2009]

WHY THE INCOMPATIBILITY CLAUSE APPLIES TO THE PRESIDENT

37

was the case then. Such evidence is probably unavailable. Consider in
this respect an eighteenth-century dictionary that defines "officer" as
13
"one who is in an Office." Given this definition and general
eighteenth-century usage, an office was officer-less only when no
person occupied the office.
At any rate, Mr. Tillman's attempt to conjure up evidence for the
concept of an officer-less office is rather beside the point, for the
Incompatibility Clause uses the term "Office" not "Officer." So even
if officer-less offices were possible, even common, when the
Constitution was ratified, it does not advance Mr. Tillman's ball. Mr.
Tillman focuses on extraneous matters, and pays too little attention to
the text of the Incompatibility Clause.
In the face of the textual evidence arrayed against his thesis, Mr.
Tillman supplies no sound historical reasons to support his argument
that the President does not occupy an office. The first bit of evidence
he presents fails to stand up to much scrutiny. Mr. Tillman recounts
that President George Washington received a key to the Bastille as a
14
gift from Marquis de Lafayette, an officer of the French government.
Had Washington occupied an office under the United States, his
unauthorized receipt of this gift would have been unconstitutional, or
so Mr. Tillman argues.15 After all, the Foreign Emoluments Clause
provides that, in the absence of congressional consent, persons
holding offices under "these United States" may not accept gifts from
"any King, Prince, or foreign State."16 Despite his evident devotion to
the Constitution, Washington never sought congressional consent to
17
keep the key. According to Mr. Tillman, Washington's unilateral
acceptance of this gift reveals that Washington did not believe that the
Foreign Emoluments Clause applied to the President and that
Washington could have reached that conclusion only if he believed
that he did not occupy an office under the United States.18
Mr. Tillman has overplayed his hand. Lafayette was neither a King
nor a Prince. So the only question is whether the gift came from a
foreign state via Lafayette. Given that Washington considered

13. NATHAN BAILEY, AN UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY 592 (1757).
14. Tillman, supra note 1, at 25–26.
15. Id. at 24–27.
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
17. See Tillman, supra note 1, at 25 & n.58 (noting Washington’s failure to notify Congress
and the lack of documentation indicating that he ever did).
18. Id. at 25–27, nn. 58, 61.
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Lafayette his adopted son, Washington likely did not regard the key
as anything more than a personal gift from an extremely close friend.
Indeed, Mr. Tillman provides absolutely no evidence that either
Washington or Lafayette viewed the key as a gift from Lafayette as a
representative of the French government rather than from Lafayette
in his personal capacity. To the contrary, Mr. Tillman quotes
Washington's letter to Lafayette, which speaks of the key as a
"testimonial[] of [Lafayette's] friendship."19 Had Mr. Tillman dug
deeper, he would have discovered that Lafayette's letter speaks of the
key as a "tribute which I owe as a son to my adopted father, as an aidde-camp to my general, as a missionary of liberty to its patriarch."20
Moreover, though Thomas Paine's letter to Washington about the
Bastille Key mentions the French government at length, Paine claims
that the key is a personal present from Lafayette.21 Given this context,
why on earth would Washington suppose that a gift from his adopted
son was a gift from the French government? In the absence of real
evidence that Washington inexplicably thought that Lafayette gave
the gift on behalf of a foreign government,22 this episode does nothing
to advance Mr. Tillman's argument.
Mr. Tillman makes an additional historical claim meant to defeat
the argument that the President is an officer under the United States.
He asserts that although the Constitution provides that the President
"shall Commission all the Officers of the United States," Washington
never commissioned himself or John Adams.23 This supposedly
indicates that neither Washington nor Adams were officers. Mr.

19. See id. at 25 & n.58 (citing Letter from George Washington to the Marquis de Lafayette
(Aug. 11, 1790), in 31 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 86 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed.,
1939)).
20. Letter from George Washington to the Marquis de Lafayette (Aug. 11, 1790), in 31
THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 85 n.56 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939) [hereinafter
WRITINGS] (quoting the Marquis de Lafayette’s March 17 letter to Washington) (emphasis
added).
21. Letter from Thomas Paine to George Washington (May 1, 1790), in 10 THE WRITINGS
OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 104–06 (Jared Sparks ed., 1847).
22. Mr. Tillman ominously asks how Lafayette came to possess the Bastille Key,
speculating that he may have received it from the French government. He also notes that
sovereigns act only through their officers, implying that Lafayette’s act was an act of the French
government. Tillman, supra note 1, at 25 n.58. But this is rather silly. The question is not
whether Lafayette obtained the key from someone in the French government. The question is
whether Washington had any reason to believe the key was a gift from the French government.
Mr. Tillman supplies no reason for any such notion. Moreover, that governments always act
through their officers hardly means that every act an officer takes is an act of the government.
Officers of government have personal lives too. See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997).
23. Tillman, supra note 1, at 16–17 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
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Tillman further declares that Presidents have never commissioned
24
either themselves or their corresponding Vice-Presidents.
Unfortunately, he offers no evidence to support any of these
propositions, but merely asserts them as fact. He neither cites any of
Washington's contemporaries nor cites any historians who claim that
Washington never commissioned himself. That no physical evidence
of such a commission exists, however, certainly does not prove that
the President never issued one. Indeed, if there were no evidence of a
commission granted to the first Secretary of State, that would hardly
establish that Washington never commissioned Thomas Jefferson.25
The same must be said about whether Washington commissioned
himself and John Adams.
When founding-era evidence is considered, an avalanche buries
the fanciful claims that the President neither occupies an office nor is
an officer. The Federalist Papers repeatedly refer to the President
26
both as an occupier of an office and as an officer. George
Washington himself used the phrase the "President and other public
27
officers" thereby indicating that the President was an officer. He also
observed that he served in the "[o]ffice of President."28 Other
29
founding-era contemporaries, such as Alexander Hamilton and
members of Congress, spoke of the President as occupying an office.30
Possibly recognizing that his argument that the President does not
occupy an office has a legion of difficulties, Mr. Tillman shifts tack in a
footnote. He suggests that perhaps the President does not occupy an
office for Incompatibility Clause purposes but rather for the purposes

24. Id.
25. For a previous project, I examined Washington-era commissions in the National
Archives. The Archives contain very few commissions even though it is likely that hundreds
were issued during the Washington era. That there is no record of other commissions does not
lead to the conclusion that Washington issued no other commission.
26. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison), NOS. 66, 68, 69, 72 (Alexander
Hamilton).
27. Letter from George Washington to Alexander White (Mar. 25, 1798), in 36 WRITINGS,
supra note 20, at 190.
28. See, e.g., Letter from George Washington to Solomon Bush (Nov. 24, 1789), in 30
WRITINGS, supra note 20, at 465–66; Letter from George Washington to Eleonor Francois Elie,
Comte de Moustier (May 25, 1789), in 30 WRITINGS, supra note 20, at 333–35.
29. See Letter from George Washington to Alexander Hamilton (Oct. 3, 1788), in 30
WRITINGS, supra note 20, at 110 n.31 (referring to Washington’s “acceptance of the office of
President”) (quoting letter from Hamilton, source unknown).
30. See Letter from George Washington to David Stuart (July 26, 1789), in 30 WRITINGS,
supra note 20, at 363 n.61 (mentioning Senate Committee appointed to determine the “style or
tides” attached to “offices of President and Vice President of the United States”) (quoting
citation unclear).
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of other provisions, such as the Necessary and Proper Clause.31 Under
this reading of the Constitution, the President occupies an office for
the purposes of Article II, is an officer for the purposes of Article I,
Section 8, Clause 18, yet neither occupies an office nor is an officer for
the purposes of the Foreign Emoluments, Incompatibility, and
Commissions Clauses. But Mr. Tillman supplies no reason why the
meaning of "office" would differ depending upon the provision in
question or why "office" sometimes includes the President and at
other times excludes him. Absent a plausible explanation supported
by historical evidence, there is no reason for supposing that the
Constitution uses a common term—"office"—in multiple ways.
II. "UNDER THE UNITED STATES"
Like a good lawyer, Mr. Tillman argues in the alternative. Besides
asserting that the President holds a public trust rather than an office,
he also claims that the President does not occupy an office "under the
United States" because the President is not a "creature" under the
United States.32
To occupy an office under the United States is to occupy an office
created under the authority of the United States. Because the
President occupies an office created under the authority of the United
States, he occupies an "Office under the United States." The
Constitution uses the phrase "Office under the United States" or its
equivalents multiple times to distinguish federal officers from officers
under the authority of a state,33 not to distinguish, in a highly obscure
manner, the President from other officers. All federal officers,
executive and judicial, occupy "offices under the United States" and
are "officers of the United States."
Mr. Tillman obviously believes otherwise. But the precise basis of
his disagreement is rather puzzling. First, he never quite specifies the
meaning of "Office under the United States." Yet this is absolutely
crucial, for if he cannot define this phrase, he cannot claim that the
President does not fit within its boundaries. Second, although he does

31. See Tillman, supra note 1, at 12–13 n.28.
32. Tillman, supra note 1, at 26–27; see also id. at 27–32.
33. See 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 200–01 (Max Farrand
ed., 1911) [hereinafter FARRAND] (reporting on Luther Martin’s Genuine Information); see also
4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 49–50 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d. ed. 1936) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES]
(reporting the comments of Archibald Maclaine at the North Carolina ratifying convention).
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not directly say so, Mr. Tillman must believe that a second category of
federal offices exists that neither arises from nor answers to the
United States. Yet, once again, Mr. Tillman does not flesh out this
second category. For instance, he never discusses which, if any, other
federal offices are likewise not "under the United States." Finally, Mr.
Tillman never explains why the Constitution embodies this hidden
and abstruse distinction between one explicit category of offices
under the United States and a second category of offices that exists
neither under the United States nor under any individual state.
Even if Mr. Tillman could explain his second category of offices
and the reason why it serves some useful purpose, his distinction
generates fairly odd conclusions about the scope of some rather
familiar clauses. First, executive and judicial officers could be
impeached and removed from their respective offices but could not
be barred from serving as President or Vice President. Article I
prohibits impeached officers from ever serving in offices "under the
34
United States." But if the President and Vice President do not
occupy offices "under the United States," then the Senate through the
impeachment process could not prevent a convicted officer from later
serving as President or Vice President. As such, a President or Vice
President could be impeached, convicted, removed and barred from
serving in all other offices. Yet these dishonored individuals, if they
ran for national office again, could still serve as President or Vice
President. Even worse, a President could vote on whether he ought to
be impeached and on whether he ought to be convicted, for under Mr.
Tillman's reading of the Incompatibility Clause, Presidents can
simultaneously serve as members of Congress.
Second, Presidents and Vice Presidents could freely accept
presents, emoluments, offices and titles from foreign states because
35
the constitutional bar applies only to offices under the United States,
and, according to Mr. Tillman, those two offices are not under the
United States. But the provision barring Presidents from accepting
foreign emoluments was arguably added to prevent Presidents from
being corrupted by foreign bribes, as occurred when Charles II
36
accepted money from France's Louis XIV. To read Article I,

34. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
35. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
36. See 2 FARRAND, supra note 33, at 68–69 (reporting Madison’s notes of Gouverneur
Morris’s statement).
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Section 9 as if it permitted the President to receive foreign bribes,
without any congressional oversight or check, makes little sense.
Third, Presidents and Vice Presidents may serve as presidential
electors because, though the Constitution bars persons who hold
offices "under the United States" from serving as presidential
37
electors, Mr. Tillman's reading suggests that sitting Presidents and
Vice Presidents are not officers "under the United States." This would
bar the Secretary of Treasury and the local federal collector of
customs from serving as electors while simultaneously allowing the
President and Vice President to serve as electors and to vote for
themselves or their successors, a rather incongruous result.
Fourth, although the Constitution prohibits religious tests, the
prohibition applies only to offices or to public trusts "under the
38
United States." Hence the prohibition on religious tests would not
apply to the President and Vice President, at least per Mr. Tillman's
view, because neither occupies an office or public trust "under the
United States."39 During the ratification fight, Tench Coxe discussed
the bar against religious tests as it applied to the President, thus
implying that the President does serve under the United States.40
Indeed, I am aware of no evidence from the founding suggesting that
the prohibition on religious tests does not apply to the President.
Moreover, to prohibit a religious test for army generals, district
attorneys, or postmasters, but to permit one for the President and Vice
President is nonsense. Assuming that Congress could create a
religious test, it could then also require that Presidents be Protestants
or that no Catholic serve as President. Essentially, Congress would be
able to mimic the English restrictions on who may serve as the
English monarch.
Finally, the Fourteenth Amendment's waivable bar against
supporters of the Confederacy who had previously taken an oath to

37. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
38. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
39. Mr. Tillman argues that the President occupies a public trust. Tillman, supra note 1, at
11 & n.25. But because this public trust is not “under the United States,” (at least according to
Mr. Tillman’s argument, id. at 26–33) the Religious Test Clause cannot apply to the President.
40. See TENCH COXE, AN EXAMINATION OF THE CONSTITUTION (1787), reprinted in
PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, PUBLISHED DURING ITS
DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE, 1787–1788, at 146 (Paul L. Ford ed., Da Capo Press 1968) (1888).
See also 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 33, at 215 (reporting comments by William Lancaster
at the North Carolina ratifying convention that a Catholic or a Muslim may become President
because there can be no religious test for the Presidency).
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the Constitution41 would not apply to rebels who sought the office of
President or Vice President because, once again, that bar would have
applied only to offices "under the United States." Jefferson Davis and
Robert E. Lee could have served as President of the United States
without a congressional waiver of the bar against oath-breaking
confederates. Reading this Amendment to require a congressional
waiver for former confederates serving as postmasters or corporals
but to not require such a waiver when a turncoat wished to serve as
President would be rather strange.
***
A reexamination of accepted orthodoxy is often useful, for
sometimes it weakens that orthodoxy, causing it to crumble. Other
times, it leads to a stronger, sounder orthodoxy, much like a
vaccination makes a person healthier. Regardless of the conclusion
reached about the soundness of the Incompatibility orthodoxy, Mr.
Tillman has done us a service.
The President occupies an office under the United States because
he occupies an office created under the authority of the United States.
Per the Incompatibility Clause, a Representative or Senator cannot
serve as President while retaining his or her seat in Congress. Mr.
Tillman tries his best to escape the clutches of this inescapable
conclusion, but his arguments are unavailing. Neither Senator Obama
nor Senator McCain could simultaneously remain in the Senate and
serve as President.

41. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3.

